According to Ted Spiker, Only 50 Percent of All Adults Read a Print or Digital Magazine.
C. King &, P. One thousand. Lester. (Autumn 2005). Photographic Coverage during the Persian Gulf and Iraqi Wars in Three U.Southward. Newspapers. Journalism & Mass Advice Quarterly. Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 623-637.
Cynthia King
Paul Martin Lester
Professors of Communications,
California Land University, Fullerton
(Electronic mail and webpage)
(c) 2005
The Wars with Iraq, 1991 and 2003 offer researchers a unique opportunity to written report differences in the visual coverage between media pools and embedded journalists. While the media pool system used in 1991 was criticized for restricting journalists and their stories too severely, the 2003 embedded journalists, although faced with restrictions as well, gave many more journalists much closer access to the fighting. Consequently, one would expect to come across differences in the printed reports between the two wars.
Termed "Desert Storm" by the military and the "Persian Gulf State of war" by the media, the clash with Republic of iraq over Kuwait in 1991 was an case of the frequently-tenuous human relationship between government officials and journalists. Hundreds of journalists from news organizations throughout the globe covered the front from Kingdom of saudi arabia, but only about 100 were chosen to make up the official armed forces press pool, with less than 20 allowed to accompany war machine officials at any i time.
Pulitzer Prize reporter Malcolm W. Brown explained, "The state of war-coverage system in the Western farsi Gulf, worked out by the Pentagon and representatives of major American news organizations terminal summer, has antecedents that appointment from the cursory Grenada war of 1983, which reporters were barred from covering. Their employers objected so strongly that the Pentagon convened a commission headed by Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, retired chief of Army information, and made upward mainly of military machine and Regime public-affairs officials. It recommended that time to come wars be covered by pools of news representatives-selected, controlled and censored past the military."one
With more than than 500,000 American troops in the 1991 Gulf State of war and fighting erupting on several fronts, newspapers, for example, relied on just one pool of 16 journalists to cover every footing unit. Although nearly reporters accepted the fact that a pool was necessary, many were frustrated by the armed forces's slowness in transporting pool members to troubled areas. Once there, an e'er-present military escort accompanied journalists.
Department of Defense ground rules signed by all journalists prohibited reporting that would in any way endanger the troops. A announcer needed military approving before attempting any story. In one case the slice was completed, the story and pictures were subject to U.S. and allied military censorship. Although there was no stated prohibition against showing wounded or killed soldiers, photographers "were carefully monitored on the battlefield in an try to prevent images of bodies or the wounded from reaching the public. The concern was that seeing such pictures might dissuade Americans from supporting the war."2 Claiming that press pool restrictions were likewise harsh, nine U.S. publications and novelists asked for a federal courtroom injunction against the Defence force Department's pool procedures. Later, a Federal judge dismissed the lawsuit.iii
The "War with Iraq" in 2003 would bear witness to be dissimilar for journalists and the military. Instead of a tiny pool of reporters covering the state of war, more than 500 "embedded" journalists, those sanctioned and trained by military officials, rode along with coalition combat units. Sherry Ricchiardi in American Journalism Review wrote, "The media had unprecedented access to America'south fighting forces. And despite initial skepticism about how well the system would work, and some dead-on criticism of overly enthusiastic reporting in the war'south early stages, the net result was a far more complete mosaic of the fighting-replete with heroism, tragedy and human error-than would have been possible without it."4 Furthermore, in a content analysis of television news coverage, a written report from the Projection for Excellence in Journalism concluded that "Americans seem far ameliorate served by having the embedding organization than they were from more express press pools during the Gulf War of 1991."five
David Shaw, media critic writer for the Los Angeles Times, noted 2 popular criticisms of the military program, "One is that the more than 500 reporters hunkered downwardly with soldiers will inevitably focus on the minor film, rather than the big film; they'll cover the individual battles their units engage in and the human-interest stories of private soldiers, instead of giving their readers and viewers an overall business relationship of the war. The other complaint is that embedded reporters are non just embedded but-inevitably-in bed with the military. Embedded journalists, co-ordinate to this argument, become so dependent on their military partners for their stories and their safety that they come to identify with the soldiers, thus abandoning their professional detachment and allowing themselves to be co-opted into reporting more favorably-and less skeptically-than the facts may warrant.6
However, Shaw was no critic of embedding. He saw editors back domicile and far abroad from military escorts as a protection from unbalanced reporting. "Editors and news directors thousands of miles from Iraq, who don't accept that same sense of dependency," Shaw writes, "have a professional obligation to evaluate and determine when, how and whether to use the stories and pictures their embedded reporters and photographers send them." Shaw puts a positive spin on the embedding programme and concludes, "Embedding is giving us a rare window on war. The critics should finish carping."seven As one media critic explained, "The U.S. military machine has generated a bounty of positive coverage of the Iraq invasion, i that decades of spinning, bobbing, and weaving at rear-echelon briefings could never achieve."8
Pentagon spokesperson Victoria Clarke agreed at a forum presented past the Brookings Institution. She said, "I am quite confident people feel and so good most this process [embedding] that you'll see more people in the armed services embracing it."ix Journalists at the forum said they liked the organisation considering it gave them admission to the front lines they otherwise might have lacked. "It broadened the lens on the battlefield," said Terence Smith, media correspondent for PBS' "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer."x
William M. Arkin, a armed services affairs analyst, praised the images and stories from embedded journalists. They "did non shy away from reporting things that the U.S. military was doing its best to ignore. Most notably," Arkin wrote, "Iraqi casualties. Fearful of public reaction, senior U.Due south. officials in the region and in Washington steadfastly refused to discuss how many Iraqi soldiers and others were dying as a upshot of the coalition's overwhelming firepower. Not so the embeds."11
Many criticized the embedding program. I of the harshest critics came from one of the armed services'southward own. Anthony Swofford author of Jarhead: A Marine's Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles writes, "Embeds serve upwards burly-chested kids full of charisma and grit; television reports soften state of war and let it to penetrate even deeper into the living rooms and minds of America. War can't be that bad if they let u.s.a. sentinel it. This is the danger of the embed."12
At that place were also many "unilateral" journalists, those not embedded and on their own, mostly within Baghdad. Photojournalist Greg Mathieson for the MAI Photo News Agency, Washington, D.C. summed up the differences in admission and censorship between the 2 wars:
"I covered both wars. The first fourth dimension in the 'DOD (Department of Defense) Gainsay Correspondents Pool' and most recently costless of the embeds wandering the battlefields and around Iraq freely. In 1990/91 our photos were edited and watched over by DOD reps in Dhahran, Kingdom of saudi arabia. [For example,] I had a shot I fabricated from a helicopter of the first U.s. battle against the Iraqis on a very small island. The Marines had simply blown upwards a storage bunker on the island as Iraqi gunboats were approaching. The mushroom cloud was of course bigger then the isle, and so DOD killed the photo thinking that people would think they used nuclear weapons.
"Shots of dead and wounded were off limits and you lot actually never got close plenty to encounter any. If you look for images of the supposed tens of thousands of Iraqis killed in the trenches early on, you won't find anything, unless some GI took a shot.
"This time [2003] you had a whole country and numerous cities and villages to cover with many more staying in Baghdad throughout the war, having a better feeling about how the Iraqis would treat the states."13
By existence closer to the fighting and freer during the War with Iraq, journalists should have been able to witness, written report, and photograph more of the brutal aspects of war on soldiers and civilians without governmental restrictions and those images should be presented to readers within the pages of their newspapers.
Considering pictures often affect a viewer emotionally more than words solitary do, pictorial displays often have the weight of established facts. Researcher Ted Spiker wrote, "The images in the news can stir emotions and foster public outcry like no other ways of expression. Photographs in news reports, fifty-fifty those that are descriptive, are 'more than d�cor.' While journalists tend to recollect more about folio-design criteria or the news in the story than about the impact of the photo, the bear on of the story is more often determined past the photograph than the story itself." Spiker added, "[B]y choosing to utilize and choosing how to use photographs, photographers and editors tin can implicitly and explicitly add and direct meaning to a photograph. For wartime photographs in particular, that's specially truthful."14 Information technology is important to consider non only the content of specific images, but also the way they were presented on the page.
Research Question
Although there are many speculations on the impact that puddle versus embedded photographers may have had on war coverage, most show remains anecdotal in nature. Theory does suggest, however, that the nuances of journalistic practices tin can significantly influence the way news coverage is framed and interpreted. Although starting time discussed over 25 years ago, media frame theory has only recently been employed by scholars to help explain the field of mass media communications from both sides of the lens or reporter'southward pad-that is, the theory concentrates on journalists, their messages, and their audience.15 Todd Gitlin, one of the beginning proponents of the theory in 1980 wrote "[M]edia frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some of import degree, for united states of america who rely on their reports."sixteen The "frame" of media gathering and packaging is in conjunction with a reader's "frame" of how she has learned about the world through previous media reports. Because of experience with media communications, readers derive a set of expectations near story topics that help them make sense of their globe. Sayre and King have written that consequently, "mass media influence united states of america to believe in a dramatic structure that drives the conflicts and resolutions of our private and public lives."17
In influencing the fashion issues are "framed," journalists and their practices are also influencing the mode issues are understood by their audiences. When a story's disharmonize is presented through dramatic images from a war, "Frames make those letters memorable and understandable."18 Ross notes that frames "employed by journalists are durable reflections of internalized professional values and social norms." nineteen She further discusses the factors that pb to the inevitability of conflict reporting, "Print deadlines, story form, journalistic routines, and editing create structural constraints that lend themselves to sure frames of reality. News values dictate that conflict and violence warrant attention; happy coexistence does not."20 Framing theory, thus, suggests that differences in pooled versus embedded journalistic practices could significantly influence the manner each war was framed. Framing theory further suggests that understanding the nature of these frames is essential to our understanding of the issues themselves.
Given the controversy over puddle versus embedded journalism coverage, it is difficult to make articulate predictions for the impact these differences may have on photographic news images. If journalists were offered more access to fighting areas during the War with Iraq than the Western farsi Gulf State of war, we might anticipate more close-up images from actual battlefield scenes by staff photographers published during the about recent conflict. All the same, if some critics are right, embedding practices might encourage journalists to frame the war more sympathetically through less graphic images. Differences in photographic coverage might be seen not only in epitome origin and content, simply also in resulting editorial decisions regarding picture placement and size. According to framing theory, each of these factors could result in different pictures, both literally and figuratively, of each state of war. Therefore, this investigation
attempts to respond the full general inquiry question: Was there a quantitative and qualitative difference between what and how visual messages were published for the first week of fighting between the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the War with Republic of iraq of 2003?
Methodology
To explore the enquiry question, a content analysis was performed on photographs from the Persian Gulf State of war, 1991 and the State of war with Republic of iraq, 2003. The content analysis was performed for all photographs from the Persian Gulf State of war, 1991 and the State of war with Iraq, 2003 for two time periods coinciding with the start of the ground war for each conflict and proceeding for an entire calendar week of problems for three newspapers: The Chicago Tribune, The Los Angeles Times, and The New York Times. For the Persian Gulf War, the allied air attack commenced on January 17, 1991, the ground set on on Feb 24, and a armistice was chosen on February 28. The State of war with Iraq was much different as the air attack began on March nineteen, 2003 with the basis assault starting the next mean solar day. On Apr 9, the U.Due south. military claimed that Baghdad fell to allied troops. For the Farsi Gulf State of war, all issues from February 25 until March 3, 1991 were selected. For the War with Iraq, all problems from March 21 until March 27, 2003 were selected. The entire coverage for the two wars was incommunicable to obtain since as of this writing the State of war with Iraq is still proceeding.
Each paper'southward national edition on microfilm was studied. The newspapers were selected because of their national and international coverage scope, their reputation as leaders inside the journalism customs, and their geographical multifariousness. The dates were selected because the content of the coverage betwixt the two time periods would be similar. For example, the New York Times headline for February 26, 1991 was "VAST ARMADA OF U.Southward. TANKS ROLLS INTO IRAQ " while the March 21, 2003 in the Los Angeles Times read "U.S. FORCES ENTER IRAQ."
Measurements
The unit of assay was the photograph. All of the pictures studied were coded for a newspaper (Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times), each twenty-four hours of the battle commencing from the coverage of the ground action and standing for a week for the years 1991 and 2003, and six characteristics including content and graphic elements.
Content.
Each photograph was assigned to one of ten content categories every bit follows:
* Fighting scenes (either straight or indirect contact with the enemy within the theater of performance such as soldiers advancing, engaged in gainsay activities, and destroyed vehicles or buildings),
* Deceased soldiers (bodies abandoned, shown with other living persons, or being transported by members from either side of the conflict),
* Injured soldiers (wounded on the battlefield or receiving handling in a hospital),
* Battlefield scenes (general images of soldiers and locations non related to actual fighting such as preparing for battle, riding or flying in war machine equipment, and resting),
* Prisoners (images of those captured on the battlefield or inside secured compounds regardless of side),
* Civilians (any persons living within the theater of operation and not continued with the military),
* Homefront subjects (people and activities related to allied civilians, except protestors),
* Protestors (any persons or activities from any country that disagree with the war effort),
* Portraits (whatever formal head and shoulders "mug" shot), and
* Miscellaneous (whatever other images not covered past the in a higher place categories such equally pictures of journalists and historical photographs).
Graphics.
Graphic elements were assigned for each picture and included:
* Source (coded as either staff photographer, pool photo, miscellaneous including wire services and freelancers, or not credited),
* Page selection (coded as frontpage, within the front section, the "B" or second section, or whatsoever other sections),
* Folio placement (coded into 3 categories with the majority of the paradigm placed on the top third, middle 3rd, or lower third of each page),
* Photographic perspective21 (coded as close, in which a viewer appeared to be within two yards of the principal source, middle, the viewer appeared to between 2 and 10 yards from the source, or far, in which the viewer appeared to exist greater than 10 yards from the source), and
* Size (coded into four categories as less than 10, 10 - 30, 31 - 50, or over l square inches).
Results
A primary coder examined 42 issues for the two time periods and found 1,023 war-related pictures. To establish intercoder reliability, a second coder analyzed 750 of the photographs. Overall, the information reflected an intercoder reliability of 96% based on Holsti's formula. Reliability estimates for each category were calculated past Scott's pi every bit follows: paper, 100 %; content, 93%; source, 100%, page pick, 97%; page placement, 95%; photographic perspective, 89%; and size, 97%.
As Tabular array 1 indicates, the number of photographs published in all categories increased dramatically from 1991 to 2003. For 1991 a total of 317 images, or 31% were constitute, while 706 images, or 69% were found for the same period during the 2003 disharmonize. Chi Square analysis revealed significant differences in content categories, (9, N=1023) = 31.seventy, p < .001. Equally a percent, at that place were more fighting scenes in 2003 (15.4%) compared to 1991 (x.1%). Notably, in that location were as well more protestor shots in 2003. In 1991 there were proportionately more than battleground scenes, prisoners, and civilian shots as well as more portraits. Counts for deceased soldiers, injured soldiers and miscellaneous pictures for both years were near the same, within 1% of each other. Overall, at that place were more than pictures from the bodily areas of battle (content categories 1 - vi), in terms of raw numbers during 2003 (404) than in 1991 (188), simply the total percent for those categories was nearly identical: 59.3% in 1991 and 57.2% in 2003. Slightly more non-battleground image categories (seven - 10) were published in 2003 (42.6%) than in 1991 (twoscore.7%), only the departure was non significant, (1, N=1023) = .338, p < .561.
There were pregnant differences directly related to the main focus of this study, east.g., the source of the published photographs. The use of staff photographers increased overall from 16.1% in 1991 to 36.7% in 2003 while the apply of pool photographers decreased from 8.two% to ane.6% with other sources and images not credited showing similar percentages, (3, N=1023) = 65.99, p < .001.22 More importantly, Table ii reveals that when the battlefield categories (1 - 6) are isolated by year, source, and newspaper, there are pregnant differences in the choices editors made for each paper. For example, in 1991 the New York Times did not use any images from staff photographers, just in 2003, 37.9% of their pictures from the battle areas came from staffers. The Chicago Tribune did not use any pool photographs in 2003 while the Los Angeles Times did non print any photographs from pool photojournalists during both wars. However, for both conflicts, the bulk of the battle area photographs came from motion picture agencies, albeit with a decrease in employ between 1991 and 2003 considering more staff photographers were sent to comprehend the Iraqi State of war.23
Although the same number of days (seven) was studied for each state of war, the Persian Gulf War was preceded by air attacks for over a month before ground action commenced while the Iraqi War'southward ground troop movements started afterward only one day of air attacks. Consequently, differences in how the newspapers covered and presented the wars to readers might occur because of differences in how the wars were executed. However, Table three shows that the percentage of battlefield images, the most dramatic coverage possible during a war, were like for each twenty-four hours and for each conflict with no significance differences between them making the ii fourth dimension periods compatible for comparison, (13, Northward=1023) = eighteen.68, p < .134.
Significant differences were found in page choice, (3, N=1023) = 199.36, p < .001. Unexpectedly, there were almost twice as many front page pictures during the 1991 conflict (13.9%) than in 2003 (vii.2%). Forepart page and A section stories deemed for 93.8% of 1991 images while just 47% of the 2003 pictures were placed on the front end page and A department. This difference, all the same, is explained as a bulk (fifty%) of pictures during the 2003 conflict were found in special "B" sections devoted prominently to the disharmonize, while just 6.iii% of 1991 images were plant in such sections.
Page placement differences were found, (two, N=1023) = 19.xc, p < .001, with a larger proportion of top and bottom images found during 1991 and more middle of the page images found during 2003. Because more pictures were printed inside separate sections, and not just on the front pages in 2003 every bit compared with 1991, these differences were seen because more total-page picture stories with images placed in the eye were designed in 2003.
Differences in photographic perspective approached significance (ii, N=1023) = 4.87, p < .08, with proportionately more than shut images during 2003 (45.3%), than during 1991 (38.2%), and more far images in 1991 (14.5%) than in 2003 (11.8%), but the differences between the wars were slight indicating that photojournalism techniques in covering wars had not changed to any groovy extent.
Size differences, (3, N=1023) = 33.26, p < .001, plant more than 1991 images between 31-50 inches (27.8%) compared to 2003 (18.half-dozen%), and more than 2003 images greater than 50 inches at 17.iv% compared to 1.ix% for 1991, with images under 30 inches proportionately very similar for both years. Again, considering many more photographs were published on full-page displays in 2003, larger images were printed.
Discussion
This research attempted to respond the question: Was in that location a quantitative and qualitative difference betwixt what and how visual messages were published for the first calendar week of fighting betwixt the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the War with Iraq of 2003? The answer, at least as applied to the findings from this study, is mixed.
The embedding program offered the opportunity for many more reporters and photojournalists to accompany armed services personnel to the various state of war zones during the 2003 State of war with Iraq than with the 1991 Western farsi Gulf War. Editors dorsum habitation selected more photographs in every content category, publishing more than twice as many images overall in 2003 every bit compared to 1991. More photographs depicted fighting scenes in 2003. However, the percentage of battle area scenes was virtually the same for the two time periods. All the same, as Table 2 reveals, staff photographers had their pictures from the battlefields published more frequently in 2003 than 1991-a straight result of photographers being able to accompany military personnel due to the embedding process.
And withal, the general public never saw many of the images taken past photojournalists. Close-up and medium views that showed bloodied combatants were but about five per centum of the total number of images for both wars. In a New York Times article for example, a motion picture submitted to Fourth dimension magazine was described as "the bloodied caput of a dead Iraqi with an American soldier standing alpine in the background."24
Arab and other news agencies effectually the earth showed their viewers the full extent of the state of war with gruesome depictions and wondered why their Western media counterparts were sanitizing the violence. The difference may be one of editorial intent. The executive director of "NBC Nightly News" said, "Yous scout some Arab coverage and you become a sense that at that place is a blood bath at the hand of the Usa military. That is not my take on information technology." The difference may also exist a judgment call based on the taste for such images by readers. The managing editor of Time, James Kelly admitted, "Yous don't want to requite the reader a sanitized war, simply there has to be some judgment and taste."25 Few images of corpses were ever shown to American newspaper readers.
Slightly more not-battlefield prototype categories were published in 2003 (42.6%) than in 1991 and many more protestor images were published in 2003. These findings reflect the higher level of controversy associated with the 2003 disharmonize.
There were more front page, forepart section, B section, and other section pictures in 2003. Interestingly, as a percentage, there were more front page and front section images in 1991. However, it would seem this is only considering more than half the 2003 images were found in special sections specifically devoted to the conflict. Thus, in 2003 at that place was not only an increase in the number of front page and forepart department pictures, only an actual doubling in overall pictures as a effect of the additional images institute in these special sections.
Findings indicated slightly more shut-up images for 2003 and more far-away shots for 1991. Differences may have been obscured by the heavier reliance on shut-up portrait "caput shots" during 1991. Further analysis limited to the viewpoint of battle scene shots might detect a greater proportion of close proximity shots for 2003. Although even and so the use of different camera lenses makes such assessments hard.
Although the sizes used for the images nether 31 square inches were roughly the same for the two fourth dimension periods, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of images that were 31 - 50 square inches and an increase in the number of big photographs over 50 square inches. In 1991, i.9% of the pictures were over 50 square inches while the pct was 16.0 in 2003. In terms of placement, more pictures were plant on the middle of the page in 2003 than in 1991.
In sum, the results of this investigation revealed many notable differences in photographic coverage of the two wars. The increase in images published by staff photographers in 2003 confirms expectations that embedding provided publications greater direct access to the conflict than did the pooled practices in identify in 1991. In 2003, there were too more pictures published in almost all content categories, more pictures published in special "B" sections of the newspapers, more photographs placed throughout the pages and more close, larger pictures.
From a framing perspective, this sheer increase in images lone might communicate a deviation in the significance and prominence of the war in 2003 compared to the 1991 conflict. In addition to an increment in raw numbers, in that location were also proportionately more fighting scenes and protestation scenes depicted in 2003. Interestingly, however, the proportion of photographs for the combined categories of battle images was very similar for both conflicts. These findings would seem to suggest that affording publications greater direct admission to war zones may not automatically result in more direct war coverage. Several factors beyond the shift from pooled to embedded journalistic practices may assist account for some of the differences and similarities in the photographic coverage of the two conflicts.
Implications
Betwixt the years covered by this study, there were at least five major economic and/or technological developments within the mass media that possibly influenced the results of this study: 1) the merger of the Tribune Co. with the Times Mirror Co., two) the introduction of color by the New York Times, iii) the further acceptance of modular design and the 50-inch web printing, 4) digital photography and advances in advice, and v) the World Wide Web.
In March 2000 the Tribune Co., possessor of the Chicago Tribune purchased the Times Mirror Co. that owns the Los Angeles Times. 26 Even so, there was no evidence constitute of editorial similarities between the two newspapers. The dramatic increase in the number of pictures used from 1991 to 2003 might exist an indication of economic pressures coming from competition from other newspapers, magazines, goggle box, and websites.
The New York Times on Monday September fifteen, 1997 bankrupt from its "greyness lady" tradition and included color photographs.27 Accompanying this conclusion was a rededication to newspaper blueprint concentrating on the visual message. For this study color could not exist a variable because microfilm is a black and white medium. 28 However, it was observed that the paper published more than images by its staff photographers than the other two newspapers within a well-designed second section in 2003.
The placement of the photographs on the pages betwixt 1991 and 2003 might take been influenced by the increased popularity of modular pattern. Every bit reported past Utt and Pasternack, "Every bit is often the case with modular design, the ascendant photo seems to have found a regular location in the middle of the page...."29 And indeed, a thirteen.9% increase in the number of pictures placed in the centre of the pages between 1991 and 2003 was found. Modular pattern also compliments the motility by hundreds of newspapers to reduce the width of their pages an inch using a fifty-inch web printing. The change can save a publisher millions of dollars in newsprint costs, the 2d highest expense for a newspaper nether labor.30 For this study, the pct of front page pictures declined from 13.nine% in 1991 to 7.2% in 2003 while the size of the images overall decreased, except for the largest sizes (over fifty square inches) that were overwhelming used within "B" or 2d sections. Some experts predict that most newspapers will somewhen switch to a tabloid size if apportionment continues to decline and newsprint costs rise.
With better access to bodily fighting scenes combined with advances in digital photography, estimator technology, and satellite telephonic communication between 1991 and 2003, photographers during the Iraqi War were able to take their images, edit them on their laptop computers, and send the pictures back abode to their editors within minutes instead of hours. This increased speed in creating, cropping, and communicating photographs meant that editors had more time to decide which and how the pictures would exist displayed. This fact also meant that editors had the luxury to review more carefully non-staff photographer choices and explains why images from miscellaneous sources were the majority used despite an increase in staff photographer pictures. Furthermore, advances in computerized folio makeup and offset press immune editors to pattern their pages with larger, loftier quality color images.31
Finally, by 2003 the World Wide Spider web was established as a communications staple allowing presentation of pictures beyond the traditional impress medium on each newspaper's website. Future inquiry should compare the pictures used on websites with those printed on paper and how pattern considerations for the Web take influenced traditional newspaper blueprint and vice versa.
The The states has been engaged in military conflicts both honorable and questionable. Inspired by the need to study each war to an broken-hearted public, journalists accept traveled to the front lines to produce stories and pictures both supportive and critical. Every bit our understanding of the advisory and emotional power of visual messages has increased, military strategists and politicians accept instituted various forms of press management of images in an attempt to protect their troops and to control public opinion. Looking at the content of the images reveals the unmistakable fact that the armed forces received the type of coverage it hoped when it installed the embedding programme. For although journalists were allowed safer access to battlefronts that were denied in wars past, the images published from the actual boxing areas were overwhelmingly pro-military. Consequently, there were few pictures published of noncombatant casualties from either side.
In his 1998 work, Body Horror, John Taylor wrote, "On balance, it is more important to accept reports and run across images of horrors than to risk forgetting them."32 Media ethicist Deni Elliott also argued that the public should get more from its media. She wrote, "U.S. citizens need something from news media that is different from that which they go from regime. To brand educated decisions for self-governance, citizens demand a media perspective that is broader than the governmental rhetoric, and citizens need images that practice more serve the government'due south agenda."33
Berenger concluded that the "frames embedded in the critical messages often reflected the worldviews (schema) of reporters and their media cultures..." which is why "newspaper photographs from the [Center Eastward] region tended to concentrate on dead and injured Iraqis, which Western press seemed to ignore."34 Whether as a tightly controlled pool lensman or as an embed with always-present war machine personnel, the photographs from the wars were filtered by editors with their own views of how the conflicts should exist framed. Every bit Ross explains, "... information technology should surprise no one that the images and texts produced by multinational media conglomerates tend to reflect the dominant ideas and ethics of society'due south aristocracy and powerful."35 American editors framed the disharmonize in vastly different ways based on their journalistic, cultural, economic, and audience expectations.
The American public and the rest of the earth have a much better agreement of the benefits, rigors and horrors of war when journalists are allowed to comprehend conflicts equally closely and completely every bit possible. Given the results from this written report, the embedding procedure was a progressive step in this process, but editors should make sure that the consummate story of the war is beingness presented to the readers back home.
Endnotes
1 Malcom Westward. Browne, "The Military machine vs. the Press," New York Times iii March 1991, sec. 6, p. 27.
2 Julianne H. Newton, The Burden of Visual Truth The Office of Photojournalism in Mediating Reality (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2001), 100.
3 "Lawsuit on Gulf War Press Curbs Dismissed," New York Times 17 April 1991, sec. A, p. 12.
4 Sherry Ricchiardi, "Close to the Action," American Journalism Review Retrieved August 4, 2003 from world wide web.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=2991.
5 Tom Rosenstiel, et. al. "Embedded Reporters: What are Americans Getting?" Project for Excellence in Journalism Retrieved August 4, 2003 from world wide web.journalism.org/resource/research/reports/war/embed/methodology.asp.
6 David Shaw, "Embedded Reporters Make for Expert Journalism," Los Angeles Times vi April 2003, role five, p. 12.
7 Shaw, "Embedded Reporters," 15.
eight Jack Shafer, "The General who Devised the "Embedded" Program Deserves a 4th Star," Slate 25 March 2003. Retrieved July 17, 2003 from slate.msn.com/id/2080699/.
nine "Assessing Media Coverage Of The State of war In Iraq: Press Reports, Pentagon Rules, And Lessons For The Time to come," The Brookings Institution, 17 June 2003. Retrieved September 11, 2005 from world wide web.brookings.org/dybdocroot/comm/events/20030617.pdf.
10 Op. Cit.
11 William Chiliad. Arkin, "Adept News from the Front," Los Angeles Times xi May 2003, M1.
12 Anthony Swofford, "The Style We Live Now: The War at Home," New York Times 30 March 2003, Sec. half dozen, p. 18.
13 Personal E-post received July 23, 2003.
14 Ted Spiker, "Cover Coverage: How U.South. Magazine Covers Captured the Emotions of the September 11 Attacks-and How Editors and Fine art Directors Decided on Those Themes." Retrieved September 11, 2005 from aejmcmagazine.bsu.edu/journal/archive/Spring_2003/Spiker.htm.
15 Wim Roefs, "From Framing to Frame Theory: A Research Method Turns Theoretical Concept," Newspaper presented for the Clan for Education in Journalism and Mass Advice conference, August 1998. Retrieved September 11, 2005 from listing.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9812E&L=AEJMC&P=R9783&I=-3&m=969.
16 Todd Gitlin, The Whole Globe is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. (Berkeley: Academy of California Press, 1980), 7.
17 Shay Sayre and Cynthia Male monarch, Amusement and Society Audiences, Trends, and Impacts. (Thou Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003), xi.
18 Ralph D. Berenger, "Gulf War Fallout: A Theoretical Approach to Understand and Improve Media Coverage of the Middle East," Global Media Periodical, Vol. three Event 5 (Autumn 2004). Retrieved on February 18, 2005 from http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/SubmittedDocuments/Fall2004/refereed/berenger.htm, three.
19 Susan D. Ross, "Unconscious, Ubiquitous Frames," in Paul Martin Lester and Susan D. Ross (eds.) Images the Injure Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media Second Edition, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 31-32.
20 Op. Cit.
21 Due to differences between the field of view offered by a detail lens, the position of a photojournalist backside it, and the position of the subject of the paradigm precluded assessing actual distances. Perceived distance is thus based on a conscientious analysis of the relative positioning of the subject and the photographer based on extensive professional person experience and communicated to the coders.
22 The use of embedded staff photographers past each newspaper was minimal. For the week in 2003 analyzed for this study, the Chicago Tribune used ane while the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times each employed two embedded photojournalists co-ordinate to movie editors of the respective newspapers (personal communications, July, 2005).
23 The iv major picture agencies represented in this study contributed 196 pictures in 1991 and 311 in 2003. Agence France-Presse (AFP) and the Associated Press (AP) percentages declined between the years (21% to 16.1% for AFP and 59.2% to 49.2% for the AP) while Reuters increased from xix.9% to 27.7% and Getty Images (which was founded in 1995) contributed 7.i% of the 2003 images from picture agencies.
24 David Carr, Jim Rutenberg, and Jacques Steinberg, "A Nation at War: Bringing Gainsay Home; Telling War's Mortiferous Story At Just Enough Distance," New York Times 7 April 2003, sec. B, p. xiii.
25 Carr, "A Nation at State of war," 13.
26 "Tribune Buys Times Mirror." March 21, 2000. Retrieved February 17, 2005 from http://world wide web.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june00/tribune_3-21.html.
27 Judy Litt, "The Gray Lady gets a Splash of Color." Retrieved February 17, 2005 from http://graphicdesign.most.com/library/weekly/aa091897.htm.
28 Even so, paper versions of the 2003 Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times newspapers were available so that the apply of color could be studied on a limited footing. For the 2 newspapers, 142 or twoscore% of all the pictures published in 2003 for the ii newspapers were printed in color. Furthermore, 107 or 75% of the color pictures for both newspapers were from the battlefield (content categories 1 - six), 56 or 39% were taken by staff photographers, and 123 or 87% were placed on the frontpage and within the A section indicating an emphasis and importance in the use of color to assist tell the story of the war to readers.
29 Sandra H. Utt and Steve Pasternack, "Front Page Pattern: Some Trends Proceed," Newspaper Research Periodical Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 2003), 59.
30 Warren Watson, "News and Pattern Considerations for the l-inch Web," November 28, 2000. Retrieved from http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/content/p1472_c1390.cfm on February xviii, 2005.
31 Op. Cit.
32 John Taylor, Body Horror Photojournalism, Catastrophe and State of war (NY: New York University Press, 1998), 7.
33 Deni Elliott, "Terrorists We Like and Terrorists Nosotros Don't Like" in Images that Injure Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media Second Edition, eds., Paul Martin Lester & Susan Dente Ross, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 2004), 51.
34 Berenger, vi-vii
35 Ross, 33.
Source: http://paulmartinlester.info/writings/iraq_war.html
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